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Regional Origin-Labeling with Quality Control:  
An Economic Analysis 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Within  the  last  decade,  an  increasing  number  of  food  scares  has  affected  the  food  markets  in 
industrialized countries. Consequently, food quality uncertainty by consumers has become a major 
issue in food and agricultural policy and in food marketing. Given this background and the fact that 
consumers continue to be more health conscious, quality signals have become increasingly important 
on food markets. 
One of these quality signals is the regional origin of foods. Numerous consumer surveys suggest that 
the regional origin has gained more weight in food-purchasing decisions (BALLING 2000, p. 19). The 
country or region of origin is now one of the most important determinants of food demand in the EU 
(BECKER 2002, p. 21). Surveys do additionally show that it is the own region which is preferred 
(GERTKEN/VON ALVENSLEBEN 1993, p. 248), but some consumers define their own region rather 
broadly. In Germany, e.g., about 40% of the respondents view the federal state in which they live as 
their own region (CMA/ZMP 2003). There is no doubt that consumers have at least some willingness 
to pay for the characteristic “regional origin”. 
The protection of the regional origin of foods is a major part of the EU’s quality policy in agriculture. 
According  to  Council  Regulation  No.  2081/1992,  “the  promotion  of  products  having  certain 
characteristics could be of considerable benefit to the rural economy, in particular to less-favored or 
remote areas, by improving the incomes of farmers and by retaining the rural population in these 
areas” (COMMISSION OF THE EU 1992). There are two kinds of regional origin which can be registered 
and protected according to this Council Regulation:  
(i)   protected designation of origin (PDO); 
(ii)   protected geographical indication (PGI). 
The first definition goes further than the second, as foodstuffs have to be produced, processed and 
prepared in that region. Additionally, a causal link has to exist between regional origin and quality: 
quality  or  characteristics  have  to  be  “essentially  or  exclusively  due  to  a  particular  geographical 
environment with its inherent natural and human factors” (Art.2, Council Regulation No. 2081/1992). 
The PGI, on the other hand, covers a product where at least one of the stages – production, processing, 
or preparation – occurs in the designating area. In a somewhat weaker formulation than for PDOs, 
quality, reputation or other characteristics are “attributable to that geographical origin” (ibid., Art. 2) 
for a PGI.  
Generic promotion of agricultural products by EU member countries as well as regional marketing 
initiatives by federal states have been widespread for years. There was a long dispute between the   2
European Commission and EU member states, e.g. Germany, on whether these regional promotion 
measures for agricultural products qualify for governmental support. The Commission’s point of view 
was confirmed in 2001 when the Community’s guidelines for State aid for advertising of products 
were established (COMMISSION OF THE EU 2001). According to these guidelines, only the promotion 
of those agricultural products can be supported which are protected designations of origin as outlined 
in  Council  Regulation  No.2081/92.  This  decision  implies  that  regional-origin  labeling  has  to  be 
associated with a quality-control system that leads to a superior quality, if the programmed is to be 
subsidized by the government.  
Despite the high – and possibly increasing – value the EU addresses to the promotion of regional 
products, there is not much analytical work on the economic impacts of those initiatives. There is, 
however, a well-established literature on the economics of generic promotion, starting from classical 
and general contributions (NERLOVE/WAUGH 1961; FORKER/WARD 1993) to recent and very detailed 
impact analyses applied to selected questions, commodities and programs (see the contributions in 
KAISER 2003). Typically, the effects of generic advertising on demand for the advertised food are 
estimated or modeled and the redistributive and welfare impacts elaborated. Especially for the U.S., 
where generic advertising is financed by producer levies, cost-benefit ratios are calculated which relate 
additional revenues and costs for producers due to program participation. Studies in this literature 
investigated the importance of cross-price effects for advertising effectiveness (KINNUCAN 1996), the 
distribution  of  impacts  of  advertising  within  the  marketing  chain  (KAISER/SCHMIT  2003),  or  the 
implications  of  market  power  for  the  allocative  and  redistributive  effects  of  generic  promotion 
(ZHANG/SEXTON 2002). Economic studies on European regional promotion programmers are rare, but 
some  do  exist  for  Germany  (e.g.,  HOFF/CLAES1997  or  HERRMANN/THOMPSON/KRISCHIK-BAUTZ 
2002). 
Despite the numerous extensions in the promotion literature, analyses were mainly carried out within 
models were one uniform price at one stage of the marketing chain is determined. When a regional 
marketing programmed includes regional-origin labeling as well as additional costs for quality control, 
as is the case under the EU Council Regulation 2081/1992, different qualities have to be distinguished. 
Market segmentation occurs between a higher-quality market for the labeled product and an average-
quality residual market. There have been models of segmented agricultural markets, e.g. on country-
of-origin labeling (LUSK/ANDERSON 2003) and on markets for foods with and without genetically 
modified organisms (SCHMITZ/MOSS/ SCHMITZ 2004). However, a segmented-market approach has 
not yet been applied to regional-origin labeling and its specific characteristics. 
Given this background, it is the objective of this paper to provide a methodological framework for the 
analysis of regional marketing programmes which include regional-origin labeling as well and quality 
assurance and control. An equilibrium displacement model for a segmented market with differential 
qualities will be developed that can be applied to a variety of regional marketing programmers. An   3
empirical application of the model is illustrated for one selected European example, i.e. “Gepruefte 
Qualitaet – Bayern”. 
 
2  The Model  
 
The objective is to model economic implications of state-financed programs assuring both quality 
control at a superior level and the regional origin of an agricultural product. 
To assess the direct and distributional effects of such programs, we develop a commodity market 
model that is segmented by both product quality and regional origin. Our segmented market model 
extends the existing work on commodity promotion evaluation which has been largely restricted to 
uniform markets. In our general model each region can produce for a uniform lower-quality market 
which we call the mass market. Each region can also incur additional program participation costs and 
produce for a high-quality market which is then regionally labeled. The demand for these high quality 
regional products may be augmented by regional promotional expenditures.  
As  stated  earlier,  a  linkage  between  improved  product  quality  and  regional  origin  labeling  is  a 
justification for government-subsidized promotional efforts. So, we seek a model that will enable us to 
evaluate  the  ability  of  promotional  programs  designed  to  send  product  quality  signals  based  on 
regional origin. However, as shown by KINNUCAN (1996), when markets are interrelated, ignoring the 
cross-price and cross-advertising effects will yield biased measures of advertising effectiveness. We 
extend this result to present a general model which allows for interactions between mass and regional 
markets with respect to price, regional advertising, supply response and differing cost structures. 
We show the structure of the model first and then discuss its possible further applications. 
 
2.1 Structure of the Model 
A multi-equation market equilibrium model for two regions engaged in regional-origin labeling which 
are related in price, advertising and costs is specified as 
Supply:       ( ) Z C P S S i
j
i
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Market Equilibrium:     i
j
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where  i  =  region  A  or  B;  j  =  mass-market  product  M,  high-quality  product  A  or  B;  
P is a vector of producer prices, A is a vector of regional advertising expenditures, C = the additional 
producer cost of participation in the regional advertising program, and; Z and X are exogenous supply   4
and demand shifters. We assume competitive markets at the farm level. Prices and quantities are 
determined endogenously according to the market equilibrium (3). 
Following  the  general  methods  used  by  KINNUCAN  (2003)  and  PIGGOTT  (2003),  the  logarithmic 
differential  approximation  to equations (1) – (3) yields the following multi-equation equilibrium-
displacement model (EDM): 
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i = A, B (regions) and, j = M, A, B (products).   5
 
Superscripts denote the region (A or B), subscripts denote products (mass-quality product M, high-
quality product A or, high-quality labeled product B), e’s are own- and cross-price elasticities of 
supply; h’s are own- and cross-price elasticities of demand, e’s are the own- and cross-advertising 
elasticities  and,  c’s  represent  the  marginal  cost  of  participation  for  each  region
1.  Equilibrium 
conditions (14) - (16) contain both supply and demand market shares  Si
j h  and  Di
j h , respectively
2. For 
instance  DA
A h  is the market share of the total demand for high-quality product A within region A. 
Given exogenous market shares, advertising quantities, and program participation cost, the 
linear  equation  system  (14)  -  (16)  can  be  solved  for  the  three  endogenous  price  change 




















































































































































where the a matrix includes own- and cross-price elasticities of supply and demand as well as market 
shares,  the  b  matrix  includes  own-  and  cross-advertising  elasticities,  and  the  c  matrix  includes 
parameters associated with the added cost of regional program participation.  
Parameterization of the above model is needed to simulate how changes in own- and cross-region 
advertising expenditure and changes in program participation cost impact market prices and quantities. 
In our empirical illustration below, we use elasticity estimates from the literature. In addition, specific 
applications  will  likely  necessitate  restrictions  to  the  general  model  to  characterize  the  unique 
dimensions of any particular empirical application. 
The solution to equation (17) can be used to evaluate the total and distribution of economic welfare 
due  to  regional  advertising.  This  can  be  accomplished  by  computing  changes  in  producers  and 
consumers surpluses, assuming parallel shifts in demand and supply.  
                                                
1 We assume the components of X and Z are subsumed in the constant terms of equations (1) 
and (2). 
2 If for supply,  B
M
A







M h S d h S d S d × + × = ln ln ln , where  SA h  and  SB h  
are supply shares on the mass market originating from region A and B, respectively. This 
same relationship holds for markets segmented on the demand side. 
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where, PS is producer surplus and CS is consumer surplus.  
 
2.2 Possible Uses of the Model 
The model presented above has been designed for a combined analysis of regional-origin labeling and 
quality control. This means that the implications of promotion expenditures for the labeled products 
can be elaborated as well as the consequences of increasing costs of producers due to the instruments 
of quality control. The model has been developed in this general from for a situation where competing 
high-quality products exist as well as a lower-quality mass product. This is typical for the current 
situation in the EU where different regional labels have been introduced for, e.g., beef and advertising 
occurs for competing labels. It is a crucial task in the empirical application of the model to define 
precisely (i) the competing high-quality products and (ii) the relevant market on which the products 
compete. 
If strong competition between high-quality segments of the market do not exist, it is of course possible 
to  reduce  the  model  such  that  the  regional  label  as  the  only  high-quality  product  has  to  be 
distinguished from a lower-quality mass product. 
There is the potential of the general model to serve other purposes as well. The EDM model could be 
applied to other relevant issues where market segmentation plays a major role. Cases in point are 
strategies  of  country-of-origin-labeling,  differentiation  of  ecological  as  opposed  to  conventional 
farming  and  foods,  or  the  labeling  of  foods  that  do  not  contain  genetically  modified  organisms 
(GMOs).  Some  modeling  approaches  of  these  markets  have  already  been  provided. 
CHUNG/ZHANG/PEEL (2004) and LUSK/ANDERSON (2003) analyze country-of-origin labeling on the 
U.S. meat sector. The COOL provision of the 2002 Farm Sector and Rural Investment Act requires 
from  September  30,  2004  that  retailers  label  the  country  of  origin  on  fresh  and  frozen  foods. 
CHUNG/ZHANG/PEEL  and  LUSK/ANDERSON  use  models  which  distinguish  between  domestic  and 
foreign products as market segments. Products from ecological as opposed to conventional farming are 
analyzed  in  a  segmented  equilibrium-displacement model by HAGNER (1997) and the impacts of 
governmental  policies  on  the  conventional  and  ecological  markets  are  elaborated. 
MOSS/SCHMITZ/SCHMITZ (2004) use a partial-equilibrium segregation model in their study of how 
considerable  resistance  against  the  introduction  of  genetically  modified  (GM)  crops  leads  to   7
segregated  markets  for  GM  and  non-GM  crops.  Based  on this  model, they illustrate  the welfare 
implications of market segregation and the relevance of segregation costs.  
Our model differs from these approaches in the literature in two major respects: 
1.  The modeling framework is applied to regional-origin labeling. None of the other modeling 
approaches has been used to study this issue. 
2.  Although individual papers go further in other respects than we do, none of the segmented-
market models in the literature covers competition between high-quality products as does the 
presented model with the labeled goods of regions A and B. 
An application of the model to a regional-labeling and quality control scheme will now be provided. 
The case study is related to the German program "Gepruefte Qualitaet – Bayern". 
 
3  An Empirical Application of the Model 
3.1 Background 
The origin of Bavarian regional-origin labeling dates back to 1985 when the program "Quality from 
Bavaria" had been established by the Bavarian Ministry for Nutrition, Agriculture and Forestry (for 
details, see HERRMANN/THOMPSON/KRISCHIK-BAUTZ 2002). After having been used only for seed 
products and breeding cattle first, a program for cattle and beef was introduced in October 1994 under 
the  influence  of  consumer  concerns  about  BSE.  To  "re-establish  and  increase  confidence  of  the 
strongly  insecure  consumer  especially  in  Bavarian  meat"  was  the  declared  objective  for  this 
program.(BSTMELF 1999, p.  10). Advertising  for  the  program occurred in various media and a 
Bavarian meat-controlling institution, "Bayerische Fleischpruefung e.V.", was responsible for quality 
and test regulations. Activities under the program were suspended in late 2002 when BSE cases were 
discovered in Germany. 
In accordance with the EU rules on protected designations of origin, a revised program was then 
started  in  February  2002:  "Gepruefte  Qualitaet  –  Bayern"  (BSTMLF  2002).  Participation  in  the 
program is open to producers, processors an retailers who agree to a detailed system of quality control. 
This is due to the fact that the regional label may only be supported under EU rules when a superior 
quality is guaranteed under the program. 
 
3.2 Model Structure for Bavarian Beef 
The empirical application of the general model refers to two regions (Bavaria and Rest of Germany) 
and  the  beef  market.  It  is  characterized  by  the  following  structure  of  the  model. 
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i = A, B (regions) and;  j = 0, M, A, (products). 
 
Again, superscripts characterize the regions A and B, subscripts the high-quality product A and the 
mass product M. According to the market situation for Bavarian beef the following major adjustments 
to the general model were made. Bavaria is the largest exporter of beef among all German federal 
states. Bavarian exports occur both under the regional label and for unlabeled beef, i.e. for the high-
quality and the mass market. Therefore, there is demand for Bavarian beef in the rest of Germany for 
both qualities (equations (26) and (28)). As exports form the region go to various regional markets in 
Germany, Bavarian beef competes with beef under various other labels as well as foreign beef. There 
is no single competitor of regionally-labeled Bavarian beef in the high-quality market sector. Thus, we 
posit that the labeled product has a superior quality than the average beef and we distinguish only the 
regional label as high-quality product from the lower-quality average beef. 
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3.3 Empirical results and Sensitivity Analysis 
Not all parameters and elasticities of the empirical model are currently available. The same holds true 
for  basic  information  on  the  market  segments  of  labeled and  non-labeled  products.  Reliable  and 
precise data, e.g., on prices on the market segments are not available from publicly available statistics. 
Information on additional costs for producers and processors due to participation in a program that 
combines quality standards and control with regional-origin labeling is lacking, too. Data have a more 
tentative character and are sometimes based on expert knowledge which is a rough estimate or a 
precise information for one certain point of time. Given this background, simulations and sensitivity 
analyses  are  particularly  important.  An additional  advantage  of  these  simulations  is  that  stronger 
changes of policy variables can be analyzed than those realized in the past. This is crucial when one is 
interested in, e.g., that Amount of additional advertising expenditures that is necessary to induce a 
defined price difference between the labelled and the non-labeled market or a sizeable increase in 
welfare of producers. 
Table 1 summarizes parameters and elasticities of the empirical model. A key parameter of the model 
for evaluating the impacts of advertising for a regional-origin label is the advertising elasticity of 
demand.  We  take  the  econometric  estimate  of  0.04  by  HERRMANN/THOMPSON/KRISCHIK-
BAUTZ(2002) measured for the program “Quality from Bavaria”. It is consistent with most studies 
from the generic-promotion literature that the advertising elasticity of demand is significantly positive 
but low – typically less than 0.1. Price elasticities of demand, with -0.8 in the high-quality segment 
and -0.4 on the mass market, are in the magnitude of econometric estimates for beef demand in 
Germany that have been estimated in the same study. Some recent econometric analyses based on 
demand systems indicate that the size of price elasticities might be at the lower end; they suggest that 
the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for beef increased over time and might now be 








Table 1: Parameters and Elasticities of the Empirical Model 
Price Elasticities of 
Supply  Demand 
Advertising and  
Cost Parameters 
Market 
Shares   10
A
M ￿   0.2 
A
AM e   -0.1 
A
A ￿   0.5 
B
M ￿   0.2 
A
M ￿   -0.4 
A
A ￿   -0.8 
B
A ￿   -1.2 
B
M m   -0.5 
d ln  A
A A      1.0 
d ln  B
A A      1.0 
d ln  A C      1.0 
A
AA e          0.04 
B
AA e          0.04 
1 ￿            -0.1 
SA
M h   0.3 
SB
M h   0.7 
DA
M h   0.2 
DB
M h   0.8 
DA
A h   0.6 
DB
A h   0.4 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
When the equilibrium-displacement model (20) to (28) is solved for prices on the high-quality and the 
mass market, it can be derived that a doubling of advertising expenditures – combined with a doubling 
of participation costs due to higher quality standards and stricter controls – would raise the price of the 
regionally labelled product by 12.7 %. Additionally, demand and supply on this market increase which 
means that the advertising effect is strong enough to overcompensate the cost effect and producers 
gain through regional-origin labelling on the high-quality market. We concentrate in the following on 
the price effects of regional-origin labeling on the two market segments. The price on the mass market 
is lowered by 2.8 %.  
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a) Only dln AA and dln  B
A A  are varied, all other coefficients are used from Table 1. 
Source: Own computations.   11
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AA ￿  are varied; all other coefficients are used from Table 1. 
Source: Own computations. 
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a) Only  A C d ln  is varied; all other coefficients are used from Table 1. 
Source: Own computations. 
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